Introduction: From discreet contacts to institutionalized partnership
The decision announced in September 2026 to elevate Moroccan and Israeli diplomatic missions to full embassies and to exchange ambassadors represents a significant institutional milestone in the contemporary history of Morocco–Israel relations. Yet the importance of this development lies less in the formal change of diplomatic nomenclature than in what it reveals about the trajectory of a relationship that has moved, over several decades, from discreet contacts and pragmatic cooperation to open diplomatic engagement, and now toward a more structured strategic partnership. On 16 September 2026, Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita and Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, in a trilateral meeting with United States Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz in New York, confirmed their agreement to elevate the two countries’ diplomatic missions to full embassies and exchange ambassadors. They also committed themselves to restoring direct air connections, completing agreements on investment protection and avoidance of double taxation by the end of 2026, and pursuing high-level reciprocal visits (Joint Statement of the United States, Morocco and Israel, 2026). The move therefore constitutes not merely a diplomatic upgrade but an attempt to transform normalization into a durable institutional architecture.
The evolution is particularly striking because Morocco and Israel have never fitted neatly into the conventional categories of either Arab–Israeli hostility or straightforward normalization. Their relationship has long possessed a dual character: politically cautious and publicly restrained on the one hand, but strategically pragmatic and historically interconnected on the other. Long before the Abraham Accords of 2020, Moroccan and Israeli officials had maintained channels of communication, particularly around regional security, intelligence, migration, Jewish affairs, and the Arab–Israeli peace process. As Antonio Gil Fons, Fionn Petch, and Rafael Segovia have demonstrated, the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 2020 should be understood as an important stage in a much longer process of pragmatic geopolitical cooperation rather than as an entirely new relationship (Gil Fons, Petch & Segovia, 2023).
The transformation has also been shaped by an exceptional historical foundation. Morocco possesses one of the deepest Jewish historical legacies in the Muslim world, while Israel is home to a very large population of Moroccan Jewish origin. Consequently, the relationship between the two states has never been exclusively intergovernmental. It also encompasses memory, family, religious heritage, tourism, cultural identity, historical diplomacy, and a complex network of human connections. As I argued in my study of the Moroccan-Israeli geostrategic relationship, the historical relationship between Moroccan Muslims and Jews provides a cultural and social foundation that distinguishes Morocco–Israel relations from many other Arab–Israeli relationships (Chtatou, 2023).
The progression from liaison offices to embassies should therefore be interpreted as the culmination of a long process of gradual normalization. The central question is whether this institutional consolidation can now produce a genuinely multidimensional strategic partnership—one capable of integrating diplomacy, security, economics, technology, culture, tourism, education, and people-to-people relations while preserving Morocco’s longstanding position on the Palestinian question. The answer will depend not simply on the existence of embassies but on whether the new diplomatic architecture can transform pragmatic interests into sustainable intersocietal connectivity.
The historical foundations: diplomacy before diplomacy
Morocco–Israel relations did not begin with the Abraham Accords. Their origins reach back to the period preceding Moroccan independence and continued through the decades in which Israel and much of the Arab world remained formally hostile. The relationship developed within a particularly complex regional environment in which Morocco simultaneously cultivated its Arab, Islamic, African, Mediterranean, and Western identities.
One important dimension was the fate of Moroccan Jewry. Hundreds of thousands of Moroccan Jews emigrated to Israel during the twentieth century, creating an unusually large Moroccan-origin community within Israeli society. This population maintained substantial emotional, cultural, linguistic, culinary, religious, and familial connections with Morocco. Moroccan Jewish heritage consequently became an informal bridge between the two societies. The relationship was not simply between Rabat and Tel Aviv; it also connected Moroccan institutions with families, communities, religious leaders, businesspeople, academics, and cultural actors in Israel.
The historical dimension is essential because Morocco’s conception of Jewish identity has traditionally been embedded within the country’s broader historical narrative rather than being treated exclusively as an external or foreign phenomenon. The Moroccan state has increasingly emphasized the Jewish component of national identity, including through the teaching of Jewish history and culture in Moroccan schools. This development has given the relationship with Israel an additional cultural vocabulary: Morocco can engage with Israel while simultaneously presenting Jewish Moroccan heritage as an integral component of Moroccan national history (Chtatou, 2023).
This historical legacy also explains why Moroccan diplomacy has frequently employed a language of coexistence, memory, and convivencia rather than exclusively strategic calculation. Morocco’s Jewish past provides a narrative through which normalization can be represented not as the abandonment of Arab or Islamic identity but as a return to a historical pluralism that existed within Moroccan society for centuries.
This does not eliminate the political difficulties surrounding normalization. The Palestinian question remains central to Moroccan public opinion and foreign policy. King Mohammed VI chairs the Al-Quds Committee of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and Morocco has consistently affirmed support for a two-state solution and for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. Moroccan diplomacy has consequently sought to maintain a distinction between developing relations with Israel and abandoning Palestinian rights. Nasser Bourita explicitly presented Morocco’s participation in the Negev Forum as compatible with continued support for Palestinian statehood and the preservation of Jerusalem’s religious and historical character (Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022).
The historical relationship is therefore characterized by simultaneity rather than contradiction: Moroccan–Israeli engagement and Moroccan support for Palestinian statehood have existed within the same diplomatic framework.
The liaison-office era: normalization without full normalization
The restoration of relations in December 2020 represented a major turning point. The Morocco–United States–Israel Joint Declaration committed the parties to establishing full diplomatic, peaceful, and friendly relations, while simultaneously reopening liaison offices in Rabat and Tel Aviv and developing cooperation in trade, finance, investment, innovation, civil aviation, tourism, water, agriculture, energy, telecommunications, and other sectors (Morocco–US–Israel Joint Declaration, 2020).
Yet the choice of liaison offices rather than embassies was significant. It reflected both ambition and caution. Morocco and Israel were normalizing relations, but the process remained deliberately incremental. Liaison offices allowed the two governments to establish institutional channels while avoiding the immediate symbolic implications of full embassy-level relations. The arrangement was particularly useful for Morocco because it preserved diplomatic flexibility in the face of the Palestinian question and domestic sensitivities.
The first years following normalization nevertheless demonstrated how quickly the relationship could acquire substance. In 2021, Israel inaugurated its liaison office in Rabat, while Moroccan and Israeli delegations intensified political, economic, technological, and security contacts. Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid’s visit to Morocco in August 2021 represented a major public manifestation of the new relationship. Subsequently, defense cooperation expanded, including the November 2021 visit of Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz to Rabat and subsequent military contacts (Israel–Morocco Bilateral Relations, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
The relationship consequently moved beyond symbolic normalization into practical cooperation. The areas involved were remarkably broad: defense technology, cybersecurity, agriculture, water management, tourism, aviation, investment, innovation, education, and cultural exchanges. The January 2021 discussions between Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita and Israeli National Security Council head Meir Ben-Shabbat already identified investments, transportation, water, environmental protection, energy, and tourism as potential fields for bilateral cooperation (Prime Minister’s Office of Israel, 2021).
The liaison-office phase therefore functioned as an institutional laboratory. It allowed the two governments to test the practical possibilities of normalization while gradually constructing habits of cooperation.
From normalization to strategic cooperation
The relationship increasingly acquired a strategic dimension because the interests of Morocco and Israel converged in several domains. Security constituted perhaps the most visible. Morocco confronts a complex regional environment shaped by tensions with Algeria, instability in the Sahel, terrorism, organized crime, irregular migration, and rapidly changing military technologies. Israel, for its part, possesses advanced capabilities in air defense, intelligence, cybersecurity, surveillance, drones, and defense technology. The convergence created strong incentives for security cooperation.
My earlier analysis of the Moroccan-Israeli relationship emphasized precisely this transition from historical affinity to strategic pragmatism. The relationship has been sustained not simply by cultural memory but by converging geopolitical interests in a changing regional system (Chtatou, 2023). The same conclusion emerges from the analysis of Gil Fons, Petch, and Segovia, who situate Morocco within Israel’s broader peripheral strategy and interpret bilateral cooperation through a neoclassical-realist framework (Gil Fons, Petch & Segovia, 2023).
Defense cooperation has consequently become one of the most concrete pillars of the relationship. It has included military consultations, defense procurement, cybersecurity, intelligence-related cooperation, and discussions concerning defense-industrial production. Yet the strategic significance of this cooperation goes beyond military hardware. It reflects the emergence of a broader security relationship in which Morocco and Israel increasingly perceive cooperation as useful in managing common or overlapping threats.
At the same time, security cooperation creates political sensitivities. For Morocco, an excessive identification with Israeli security policy could create tensions with its diplomatic role in the Arab and Muslim worlds. For Israel, the relationship with Morocco provides strategic depth in North Africa and a valuable partnership with a state possessing strong relations with Europe, Africa, the United States, and the Arab world. The relationship therefore contains a mutual strategic logic, but also requires careful diplomatic management.
The Negev Forum and the multilateralization of normalization
The emergence of the Negev Forum represented another important stage in this process. Rather than treating normalization as a collection of bilateral agreements, the forum attempted to create a regional framework encompassing Israel, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, and the United States. Its working groups addressed areas such as clean energy, education, health, food and water security, tourism, and regional security.
Morocco’s participation was particularly important because Rabat could position itself not simply as an Arab state normalizing relations with Israel but as a bridge between North Africa, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the United States. I argued in a Washington Institute analysis that the Negev Forum offered Morocco an opportunity to broaden economic relations while simultaneously contributing to regional diplomacy and bridging political divides (Chtatou, 2023, The Washington Institute).
The Moroccan approach to normalization has therefore been characterized by a preference for what might be termed partnership through networks. Rather than reducing relations to a single bilateral axis, Morocco has attempted to embed its relationship with Israel within wider frameworks involving the United States, Gulf states, Africa, and Europe.
This is important because the future of the relationship may depend less on bilateral trade alone than on its ability to become a platform for wider regional cooperation. Water scarcity, renewable energy, food security, climate adaptation, digital technology, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, health, and agricultural innovation are all areas in which Moroccan and Israeli capabilities can potentially complement each other.
The 2026 embassy decision: institutionalizing the strategic bargain
The September 2026 decision marks a qualitative change because embassies possess a political and bureaucratic weight that liaison offices do not. An embassy signifies permanence, diplomatic normalization, and the expectation of sustained state-to-state relations. The appointment of ambassadors also creates a more authoritative channel for political dialogue and crisis management.
The 2026 trilateral statement explicitly confirms that Morocco and Israel will elevate their diplomatic missions to full embassies and exchange ambassadors. It simultaneously commits them to restoring direct air connections, concluding investment-protection and double-taxation agreements, and deepening technological, security, and innovation cooperation (United States–Morocco–Israel Joint Statement, 2026).
The significance of this package lies in its comprehensiveness. The embassy decision is accompanied by measures designed to make the relationship economically and socially more sustainable. Diplomatic normalization without commercial infrastructure can remain fragile; commercial relations without human mobility can remain limited; and security cooperation without political dialogue can become excessively transactional. The 2026 agenda attempts to connect these dimensions.
The proposed investment-protection agreement is particularly significant. Such an agreement can reduce institutional uncertainty and create greater incentives for businesses to invest across borders. Likewise, an agreement preventing double taxation can facilitate cross-border business activity. These instruments may appear technical, but they are precisely the kinds of institutional mechanisms through which diplomatic relationships become economically durable.
The planned restoration and expansion of direct flights is equally important. Air connectivity is not simply an economic matter. It facilitates tourism, family visits, academic exchanges, business travel, religious pilgrimage, cultural cooperation, and people-to-people diplomacy. In the Moroccan-Israeli context, where historical family and cultural connections are unusually extensive, aviation can become one of the principal mechanisms for transforming diplomatic normalization into societal connectivity (Al Jazeera, 2026).
The Moroccan Jewish dimension: memory as diplomacy
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Morocco–Israel relations remains the Moroccan Jewish component. Israel’s Moroccan Jewish population represents a living bridge between the two countries. Moroccan synagogues, cemeteries, saints’ shrines, culinary traditions, music, Judeo-Arabic and Judeo-Amazigh cultural memories, and family networks constitute a form of transnational heritage.
This heritage has acquired renewed political significance because Morocco increasingly presents Jewish history as part of its national historical narrative. The Moroccan state’s protection of Jewish heritage and its recognition of Jewish culture within national education have created a framework in which Moroccan Judaism can function as a cultural bridge rather than merely as a historical memory.
Bourita himself has emphasized this dimension. On the first anniversary of the 2020 trilateral declaration, he argued that the partnership should ultimately benefit people and specifically highlighted the possibility of enabling Israelis of Moroccan origin to reconnect with the land of their ancestors. He also presented the Jewish component of Moroccan identity as an important element of the relationship (Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021).
This is potentially one of the strongest foundations for a long-term relationship. Strategic partnerships constructed exclusively around military and geopolitical calculations can become vulnerable to changes in regional politics. Cultural relationships, by contrast, can possess greater resilience. Morocco and Israel have the possibility of developing a relationship in which Jewish Moroccan heritage becomes a platform for tourism, academic research, museum cooperation, genealogy, religious studies, cultural festivals, music, food, literature, and educational exchange.
The concept of convivencia is therefore more than historical nostalgia. Properly institutionalized, it could become part of the contemporary diplomatic vocabulary of the two countries.
The Palestinian question and the limits of normalization
The movement toward embassies does not eliminate the central difficulty of Morocco–Israel relations: the Palestinian question. Indeed, the more institutionalized the relationship becomes, the more important it will be for Rabat to demonstrate that normalization with Israel does not imply abandonment of Palestinian aspirations.
Morocco’s diplomatic position has consistently emphasized a two-state solution, an independent Palestinian state on the basis of the 1967 borders, and a special status for Jerusalem. King Mohammed VI’s position as chairman of the Al-Quds Committee gives this issue a particular importance in Moroccan foreign policy. Bourita reiterated this position in the context of the Negev Forum, arguing that Moroccan engagement with Israel should contribute to peace rather than replace the Palestinian question (Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022).
This produces a distinctive diplomatic formula: normalization without political absorption. Morocco can maintain relations with Israel while continuing to advocate Palestinian statehood. The sustainability of this formula, however, depends heavily on the regional political environment. Periods of intense Israeli–Palestinian violence inevitably place pressure on Arab–Israeli normalization.
The challenge for Moroccan diplomacy is consequently to prevent the bilateral relationship from becoming identified exclusively with Israeli security priorities. A durable partnership would require Rabat to retain diplomatic space for Palestinian advocacy and to demonstrate that Moroccan–Israeli cooperation can coexist with efforts toward a negotiated political settlement.
Conversely, Israel’s ability to understand and accommodate Morocco’s diplomatic role could become an important factor in determining the future depth of bilateral relations. Morocco’s value to Israel derives partly from precisely this broader diplomatic identity.
From transactional normalization to strategic partnership
The distinction between normalization and strategic partnership is essential. Normalization means establishing official relations and creating mechanisms for interaction. Strategic partnership implies something deeper: institutionalized cooperation based on convergent long-term interests.
Morocco and Israel are now approaching the second category, but the process remains incomplete. The relationship has developed rapidly in defense, technology, diplomacy, and commerce, yet the broader societal foundations remain less developed.
A mature strategic partnership would require several additional layers. First, economic cooperation must move beyond individual transactions toward sustained investment partnerships. Second, technological cooperation should create joint ventures and research ecosystems rather than simply commercial sales. Third, tourism should become multidirectional and include historical, cultural, religious, and family tourism. Fourth, universities should develop joint programs in Mediterranean studies, Jewish studies, Islamic studies, water management, climate science, artificial intelligence, agriculture, and security studies. Fifth, civil-society and cultural exchanges should complement government-to-government diplomacy.
The 2026 agreements provide a framework for precisely this institutionalization. The announced economic agreements, renewed aviation links, ambassadorial exchanges, and planned high-level visits can transform the relationship from episodic diplomacy into routine diplomacy (Arab News, 2026).
The distinction between strategic partnership and alliance should nevertheless be maintained. A partnership does not necessarily mean that the two countries share identical regional priorities or that one automatically supports the other’s policies. Morocco has its own North African, African, Arab, Islamic, Mediterranean, and Atlantic strategic interests. Israel likewise possesses its own security imperatives and regional calculations. The durability of the relationship will depend precisely on the ability of both states to cooperate without demanding complete political convergence.
A new Mediterranean and North African dimension
The Morocco–Israel relationship also has implications beyond the bilateral sphere. Morocco occupies a strategic position connecting the Mediterranean, Atlantic, Africa, and the Arab world. Israel, meanwhile, has increasingly developed relations with Mediterranean and African states. Their cooperation could consequently contribute to new forms of Mediterranean connectivity.
Morocco’s role in Africa gives Israel an additional channel into African economic and diplomatic networks. Israel’s technological capacities can, in turn, complement Moroccan ambitions in agriculture, water management, renewable energy, digitalization, and industrial development. The relationship can therefore become part of Morocco’s wider strategy of positioning itself as a hub linking Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.
This dimension was already visible in the architecture of the Abraham Accords and Negev Forum. The objective was not merely to create bilateral Israeli–Arab relations but to establish networks of cooperation connecting several regions and sectors (Chtatou, The Washington Institute, 2023).
The embassy upgrade may consequently be understood as the institutional foundation for a more ambitious regional role.
The danger of excessive securitization
Yet the strategic relationship also contains risks. If security and defense dominate the relationship, the broader diplomatic project could become overly securitized. Such an outcome would weaken precisely those elements that distinguish Morocco–Israel relations from purely transactional strategic cooperation.
The long-term strength of the relationship is likely to depend on its ability to balance hard power with soft power. Defense cooperation can provide strategic depth; economic cooperation can create material interdependence; but cultural diplomacy and human mobility can create societal legitimacy.
This is particularly important in Morocco, where the Palestinian question remains emotionally and politically significant. The durability of normalization cannot simply be measured by the number of agreements signed by governments. It must also be assessed through the development of social contacts, tourism, educational cooperation, cultural exchanges, and a wider public understanding of the relationship.
The Moroccan state’s historical narrative of Jewish–Muslim coexistence offers an important resource here. If used constructively, it can present normalization as an extension of Morocco’s plural historical identity rather than merely as a geopolitical bargain.
Conclusion: From diplomatic normalization to strategic maturity
The trajectory from discreet contacts to liaison offices and finally to embassies is one of the most remarkable developments in contemporary Moroccan diplomacy. The relationship between Morocco and Israel has moved through several distinct phases: clandestine and pragmatic contacts; cautious diplomatic engagement; the reopening of liaison offices in 2020–2021; accelerated economic, technological, and security cooperation; participation in the Negev Forum; and, finally, the 2026 decision to establish full embassies and exchange ambassadors.
The significance of the September 2026 decision lies therefore not simply in the physical transformation of diplomatic missions. It represents the institutional consolidation of a relationship that has progressively acquired strategic depth. The joint decision to combine embassy-level representation with direct flights, investment protection, double-taxation arrangements, high-level visits, and technological and security cooperation indicates an effort to create the infrastructure of a durable partnership (United States–Morocco–Israel Joint Statement, 2026).
The historical dimension remains equally important. As I have argued elsewhere, Morocco and Israel possess a relationship whose foundations precede formal normalization by many decades and whose cultural roots extend into the long history of Moroccan Jewish life (Chtatou, 2023). This heritage constitutes an unusual diplomatic asset. It creates possibilities for a relationship based not solely on strategic calculation but also on shared memory, cultural exchange, family connections, and a common Mediterranean history.
Yet strategic partnership should not be confused with the disappearance of political differences. Morocco’s continued support for Palestinian statehood, its role concerning Jerusalem, and its broader Arab and Islamic diplomatic identity remain important components of its foreign policy. The relationship will therefore have to accommodate disagreement as well as cooperation. Its maturity will ultimately be demonstrated not by the absence of political tensions but by the capacity of both governments to manage them without destroying the larger framework of partnership.
The movement from liaison offices to embassies can thus be interpreted as the beginning of a new phase rather than the conclusion of normalization. The first phase was about recognition; the second about cooperation; the emerging third phase is about institutionalization. The strategic question now is whether institutionalization can evolve into genuine human, economic, cultural, technological, and regional connectivity.
For Morocco, the relationship offers access to technological capabilities, investment, security cooperation, tourism, and a potentially valuable bridge to Israeli and American networks. For Israel, Morocco offers a strategically located partner with deep African, Arab, Mediterranean, Islamic, and Western connections, as well as a unique historical relationship with Jewish communities in Israel. For the United States, the partnership represents one of the most developed bilateral relationships generated by the Abraham Accords and a potential component of broader regional integration.
The real test, therefore, will not be whether Morocco and Israel can open embassies. They can. The more consequential question is whether those embassies can become instruments of a broader architecture of peace, prosperity, innovation, cultural understanding, and regional cooperation. If they succeed, the transition from liaison offices to embassies will represent more than diplomatic normalization: it will mark the emergence of a mature Moroccan–Israeli strategic partnership grounded simultaneously in pragmatic interests and an unusually deep historical relationship.
In this sense, the story of Morocco and Israel is no longer adequately described as one of normalization alone. It is a story of gradual institutionalization, in which discreet diplomacy has progressively become formal diplomacy, formal diplomacy has generated practical cooperation, and practical cooperation is now seeking to become a durable strategic partnership. The future of that partnership will ultimately depend on whether its strategic dimension can be matched by economic interdependence, cultural connectivity, societal exchange, and a credible contribution to the wider search for peace in the Middle East.
