November 8, 2026

The Israel–UAE Agreement: What Would Be Written Today

Article by Asael Fish

While filling my shopping cart at the supermarket, I came across several kinds of silan, the date syrup. I looked at my shopping list, and it said nothing about choosing one based on where the silan came from or what its background was. I took one of the bottles closest to the aisle and moved on. When I unpacked the groceries at home, I turned the bottle around, and there it was, proudly listed in the ingredients: 100% dates from the United Arab Emirates.

It was a small surprise, but a telling one. Six years after the Abraham Accords, the relationship between Israel and the UAE has reached Israeli kitchen shelves, mostly without anyone noticing. Much of that relationship works the same way: real and growing, but rarely in the headlines. The gap between what is visible and what is actually happening is a good place to start asking how the relationship has changed, and what that change would mean on paper.

This background paper asks one question: if Israel and the United Arab Emirates were drafting their agreement in October 2026 rather than in September 2020, how would it be different?

The 2020 agreement was a civilian normalization agreement whose security language stayed general, with no defense mechanisms written into it (The National, 2020a). An agreement written today would keep the civilian core, but add a defined security chapter that anchors cooperation already taking place, and state explicitly where the partnership stops.

Each of the following sections examines one part of that answer: what was signed, what changed, what would stay, what would be added, and what would be left out of the picture.

Background: The Abraham Accords and Normalization

The agreement was signed at the White House on September 15, 2020, and put into action in January 2021. The agreement established full diplomatic relations and was Israel’s first agreement with an Arab state since the treaty with Jordan in 1994. 

Its content was mostly civilian: embassies, direct flights, trade, investment, tourism, health, and science. At the same time, Israel agreed to suspend plans to apply sovereignty to parts of Judea and Samaria (Times of Israel, 2020; The National, 2020b).

The context matters for understanding the idea. In 2020, the shared concern about Iran was a central motive, but it stayed in the background and was not written as a commitment (GIS Reports, 2026). The treaty’s security language limited cooperation to peace and stability and included no mutual defense clause (The National, 2020a). Security cooperation ran through separate, quiet channels, according to foreign reports (Israel Hayom, 2025).

 

 

The Relationship Was Put to the Test 

During the war in Gaza after October 7th, 2023, Abu Dhabi publicly criticized Israel’s policy in Gaza and Judea and Samaria. In September 2025, Reuters reported that the UAE was considering downgrading relations if Israel annexed territory of Judea and Samaria. In the end, even after those statements, the embassies stayed open, and trade continued (Israel Hayom, 2025; UAE Embassy in Tel Aviv, 2026).

The War With Iran Made Security Unavoidable 

The larger campaign against Iran began at the end of February 2026, and Iran attacked the UAE more than any other country. In May, the United States ambassador to Israel confirmed that Israel had sent Iron Dome batteries to the UAE, along with crews to operate them (AFP via The Sun, 2026).

The Leaders Congregated

On September 27, 2026, Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Mohamed bin Zayed met in Abu Dhabi, and both countries confirmed it (Khaleej Times, 2026; Hürriyet Daily News, 2026). This was a change from the approach in May, when Abu Dhabi denied an Israeli report of a secret visit and stressed that its relations with Israel are public and conducted within the framework of the Abraham Accords (UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2026).

 

What Would Stay in the Agreement?

The civilian part of the 2020 agreement would be written today in almost the same form, because it is the part that has proven itself.

Trade in goods between the two countries reached $3.2 billion in 2025, almost unchanged from 2024, and cumulative trade from September 2020 to May 2026 stands at about $14.5 billion (UAE Embassy in Tel Aviv, 2026). The important point here is stability: trade in goods, which stood at $2.56 billion in 2022, did not decline in the years, even when political tension was at its peak (Arab News, 2023).

Still, an updated text might be more modest in its targets. The 2022 free trade agreement set a goal of more than $10 billion within five years, and trade in goods is still far from it (UAE Ministry of Economy, 2022). The balance is also not entirely even: about 80% of the trade is exports from the UAE to Israel (UAE Embassy in Tel Aviv, 2026).

One point needs precision: these figures measure goods only. They do not include software and high-tech services such as cyber and artificial intelligence, which, according to a 2021 estimate by the Israel Export Institute, make up a significant share of trade and for which there are no official figures (Calcalist, 2021). Even within trade in goods, technology stands out: optical, medical and precision instruments and electrical equipment, together with precious stones and metals, account for about 77% of Israeli exports to the UAE (UAE Embassy in Tel Aviv, 2026). The full economic picture is therefore broader than the official number, but it cannot be quantified.

Why This Goes Under The Radar

If the numbers are this significant, why does so little of the cooperation make it to the news? Three reasons stand out. The first is measurement: official statistics count goods, not the software and services in which much of the Israeli side of the relationship takes place, so a large part of it simply never appears in the figures (Calcalist, 2021). The second is timing: the first agreements made headlines because normalization itself was news, and once they moved into implementation, the work became routine and drew far less attention (Kamins, 2026). The third is politics: after the war in Gaza began, Israeli officials and executives told Reuters that business ties with the UAE remained intact but were now conducted away from public view, and few were willing to discuss new deals (Reuters, 2024).

Yet the relationship is visible to anyone who looks for it. Passenger traffic between the two countries reached about 1.53 million in 2025, up about 71% from 2024 (UAE Embassy in Tel Aviv, 2026). And sometimes it is visible on the back of a bottle of silan.

A 2026 agreement would therefore probably focus less on overall volume and more on defined fields: technology, logistics, energy, health, food security and regional connectivity. (The UAE invests heavily in agriculture abroad to secure its food supply, from Egypt to Morocco and Mauritania, and Israel is a pioneer in agriculture, and in desert agriculture in particular.) These are the fields that both countries themselves point to today as their areas of growth (UAE Embassy in Tel Aviv, 2026; Enterprise AM, 2025; AgNavigator, 2026; Kamins, 2026).

Alongside trade, an updated text would give more room to ties between institutions and people, the area where the gap between declarations and implementation is widest. The Weizmann Institute of Science and the Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence signed a memorandum of understanding for joint research in September 2020 (Weizmann Institute of Science, 2020), and the Israeli company Watergen, which produces water from air, signed a partnership with Abu Dhabi’s Al Dahra the same year to set up a manufacturing and distribution center in the emirate (WAM, 2020). However, many memoranda of understanding never became active programs, and student exchanges remain limited (Kamins, 2026). Climate, water and desert agriculture are fields in which both countries face a shared challenge. They are less politically sensitive, they are positive, and they are even flourishing.

What Might Be Added?

The biggest change in a 2026 text would be an open security chapter, because security is the area in which reality has moved furthest from the 2020 text. The most established component is air defense. According to the Financial Times, in addition to Iron Dome, Israel also deployed a version of the Iron Beam laser system in the UAE, along with the Spectro drone-detection system (Times of Israel, 2026). A security chapter would anchor what has already been done: shared early warning, integration of interception systems, and a procedure for deploying forces in an emergency.

The Red Sea, Sudan and the geography of straits. Caution is needed here, and that caution is itself part of the answer. Both countries share an interest in freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and in preventing an Iranian foothold on its shores. But the war in Sudan is not a shared arena in the same sense. The government of Sudan accuses the UAE of arming the Rapid Support Forces, and Abu Dhabi denies it (Reuters, 2025; Al Jazeera, 2025). Some reports also attribute Israeli involvement to these moves (The New Arab, 2025), but they are unverified, and the information environment around Sudan is saturated with propaganda and selective leaks (The Media Line, 2026).

Sudan signed the Abraham Accords Declaration with the United States in January 2021, but a normalization agreement with Israel itself was never signed or ratified, and the two countries have not exchanged ambassadors (Atalayar, 2020; Morocco World News, 2023; The New Arab, 2025). A realistic agreement would therefore address the Red Sea in terms of maritime security and intelligence sharing, and would not mention Sudan as an arena of operations. Israeli involvement in the conflict would close the door on future relations with Khartoum and deepen the concern in Riyadh and Cairo about an Israeli–Emirati axis at the southern entrance to the Red Sea (Foreign Policy, 2026).

What it is not. Such a chapter would not be a mutual defense pact. Neither country has committed to fighting alongside the other, and Abu Dhabi is careful to present the relationship as public and limited to the framework of the Abraham Accords (UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2026). The more accurate description is a defensive security partnership: regulated, graduated, and focused on the missile and drone threat.

Where Does the Partnership Stop?

An agreement written today would also be more explicit about its limits, on three issues.

The status of Judea and Samaria (West Bank) and the question of a Palestinian state. 

In 2020, the agreement was settled for suspending the annexation plans. Since then, Abu Dhabi has made clear that annexation could lead to a downgrading of relations (Israel Hayom, 2025), and it continues to publicly support the establishment of a Palestinian state (Gulf News, 2025). An updated text would likely include a clearer commitment on annexation, because this is the point at which the relationship was nearly damaged.

Saudi Arabia

The closeness between Israel and the UAE has not brought Riyadh to an agreement. Saudi Arabia remains reluctant to establish full relations (GIS Reports, 2026), and the UAE left OPEC in May 2026 amid growing friction with Riyadh (Associated Press, 2026). A bilateral agreement cannot replace a broad regional framework, and it would need to take care not to appear aimed against other Arab states.

Public Opinion

Public support for the Accords in the UAE declined in the years after the signing (Britannica, n.d.). This is why Abu Dhabi prefers declared, official cooperation over secret arrangements, and it is also why the civilian part, the part visible to the public, remains essential to the agreement.

Policy Recommendations

Four recommendations for both sides emerge from the analysis, all of them resting on cooperation that already exists.

  • Anchor air defense in an official framework. A permanent mechanism for early warning and interception coordination is better than arrangements made during an emergency, and it fits Abu Dhabi’s preference for open, declared relations.
  • Separate maritime security from internal conflicts in the region. Cooperation in the Red Sea should focus on freedom of navigation and intelligence, and avoid involvement in the war in Sudan.
  • Turn memoranda of understanding into active programs. Joint research fellowships, student exchanges and shared laboratories in climate, water and artificial intelligence are a relatively cheap investment whose results last for years.
  • Bring in a third party where public sensitivity is high. Frameworks such as I2U2, UN agencies or the World Bank make it possible to continue joint projects even in periods of tension (Al Jazeera, 2026).

What Fruit Could Strengthening Ties Bring?

A defensive security partnership alongside deep civilian ties can create a system of mutual assistance in times of crisis: in missile defense, but also in health, food security and water. It can also serve as an example for other countries in the region, provided it is seen as open to others joining and not as aimed against them.

Conclusion

The 2020 agreement assumed that civilian relations would build trust and that security would stay behind the scenes. Six years later, the two parts have traded places in weight: trade settled at a more modest level than expected, and security became the area in which the partnership was tested and proved itself.

The examples in this paper lead to the same conclusion. The stability of trade in the years of tension, the deployment of defense systems during the war with Iran, and the open meeting in September show that the relationship is resilient. The warning on annexation, the caution around Sudan and the Saudi distance show that it is also limited.

An agreement written today would therefore not be more ambitious than its predecessor, but more precise: a civilian core with realistic targets, a defensive security chapter that anchors what already exists, and written limits where in 2020 there was ambiguity. This is a positive account of the relationship, because it rests on what has already been achieved and not on promises. Such an agreement might also allow more Emirati date syrup to make their way to Israel, because we deserve more of that sweetness, and in return we will treat them to our olive oil.

 

References

AFP via The Sun. (2026, May). UAE denies secret Netanyahu visit reports.https://thesun.my/news/world-news/uae-denies-secret-netanyahu-visit-reports/

AgNavigator. (2026, October 8). UAE looks abroad for food security as Elite Agro unveils $180m investment push.https://www.agnavigator.com/Article/2026/10/08/uae-looks-abroad-for-food-security-as-elite-agro-unveils-180m-investment-push/

Al Jazeera. (2025, May 9). UAE denies supplying Sudan paramilitaries with Chinese arms.https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/9/uae-denies-supplying-sudan-paramilitaries-with-chinese-arms

Al Jazeera. (2026, February 26). India-Israel axis: What are the IMEC corridor, I2U2 grouping Modi spoke of?https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/26/india-israel-axis-what-are-the-imec-corridor-i2u2-grouping-modi-spoke-of

Arab News. (2023, January 23). UAE-Israel trade hits record high to reach $2.56bn in 2022.https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2237391

Associated Press. (2026, April 28). United Arab Emirates says it will leave OPEC effective May 1.https://abcnews.com/Business/wireStory/united-arab-emirates-leave-opec-effective-1-132450136

Atalayar. (2020, October). Sudan normalises its relations with Israel.https://atalayar.com/en/content/sudan-normalises-its-relations-israel

Britannica. (n.d.). Abraham Accords.https://www.britannica.com/topic/Abraham-Accords

Calcalist. (2021). Israeli trade data with the UAE, January–July 2021 [Hebrew]. https://www.calcalist.co.il/local_news/article/r11niyigy

Enterprise AM. (2025, August 18). Kurdistan’s Zakho attracts AED 12 mn investment from the UAE for an agricultural project.https://enterpriseam.com/uae/2025/08/18/kurdistans-zakho-attracts-aed-12-mn-investment-from-the-uae-for-an-agricultural-project/

Foreign Policy. (2026, January 27). Red Sea rivalries risk unraveling the Horn of Africa.https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/27/sudan-united-arab-emirates-saudi-arabia-ethiopia-trump-red-sea/

GIS Reports. (2026, August). Israel-UAE defense ties survive their first war.https://www.gisreportsonline.com/?p=93619

Gulf News. (2025, November). UAE renews call for independent Palestinian state.https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/uae-renews-call-for-independent-palestinian-state-1.500364222

Hürriyet Daily News. (2026, September). Netanyahu office confirms UAE visit.https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/netanyahu-office-confirms-uae-visit-227511

Israel Hayom. (2025, September 18). UAE says Israeli annexation could lead to downgrading ties.https://www.israelhayom.com/2025/09/18/uae-says-israeli-annexation-could-lead-to-downgrading-ties/

Kamins, R. (2026, August 24). Israel–United Arab Emirates relations: From normalization to stagnation, another lost cause or room for new opportunity? The Abraham Bridge Initiative (TABI). https://abrahambridge.com/2026/08/24/israel-united-arab-emirates-relations-from-normalization-to-stagnation-another-lost-cause-or-room-for-new-opportunity/

Khaleej Times. (2026, September 28). UAE President receives Israeli PM, discusses bilateral relations.https://www.khaleejtimes.com/uae/uae-president-receives-israeli-pm-netanyahu-september-2026

Morocco World News. (2023, February). Sudan, Israel announce reaching deal on normalizing relations.https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2023/02/36643/sudan-israel-announce-reaching-deal-on-normalizing-relations/

Reuters. (2024, May 8). Gaza war cools Israel’s once red-hot business ties with UAE.https://www.aol.com/gaza-war-cools-israels-once-103349576.html

Reuters. (2025, May 6). Sudan to cut ties with UAE, defence council says.https://www.yahoo.com/news/sudan-cut-ties-uae-defence-144904589.html

The Media Line. (2026). Sudan’s war spills into the Horn as Gulf strategies collide on Red Sea security.https://themedialine.org/mideast-daily-news/sudans-war-spills-into-the-horn-as-gulf-strategies-collide-on-red-sea-security

The National. (2020a, September 15). Abraham Accord: What its 12 points say.https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/abraham-accord-what-its-12-points-say-1.1078323

The National. (2020b, August). Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed: Support for Palestinian cause is unwavering.https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/sheikh-abdullah-bin-zayed-support-for-the-palestinian-cause-is-unwavering-1.1071033

The New Arab. (2025, November 13). Blood and business: The Israel-UAE nexus fuelling Sudan’s war.https://www.newarab.com/analysis/blood-and-business-israel-uae-nexus-fuelling-sudans-war

Times of Israel. (2020, September 15). Full text of the ‘Treaty of Peace’ signed by Israel and the United Arab Emirates.https://www.timesofisrael.com/full-text-of-the-treaty-of-peace-signed-by-israel-and-the-united-arab-emirates/

Times of Israel. (2026, April). Israel deployed laser system in UAE to help intercept Iranian missiles and drones — report.https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/israel-deployed-laser-system-in-uae-to-help-intercept-iranian-missiles-and-drones-report/

UAE Embassy in Tel Aviv. (2026). Economic cooperation.https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/Missions/Tel-Aviv/UAE-Relationships/Economic-Cooperation

UAE Ministry of Economy. (2022). UAE and Israel sign Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement.https://www.moet.gov.ae/en/-/uae-and-israel-sign-comprehensive-economic-partnership-agreement-to-advance-bilateral-trade-beyond-usd-10-billion-in-5-years

UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2026, May 13). UAE denies reports regarding visit by Israeli Prime Minister or receiving any Israeli military delegation.https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/MediaHub/News/2026/5/13/uae-isreal

WAM. (2020, November 26). Al Dahra, Israel’s Watergen sign strategic partnership in water security.https://www.wam.ae/en/article/hszrbck5-dahra-israels-watergen-sign-strategic-partnership

Weizmann Institute of Science. (2020, November 11). Weizmann signs MoU with Mohamed bin Zayed University.https://www.weizmann.ac.il/WeizmannCompass/print/2740

 

Related Articles

Abraham Accords

Bridging the Strait: Same Roots, New Rhythm

Institutional Fragility, Civil Resilience, and the Future of Israeli-Moroccan Normalization When the Abraham Accords brought Israel and the Kingdom of Morocco together through the December 2020 Joint Declaration alongside the

Read More »
arab

The Abraham Bridge Podcast

The Accords Made History. We’re Keeping It’s Relevancy. In 2020, Israel, the UAE and Bahrain signed the Abraham Accords, opening a new chapter in the Middle East. Morocco joined soon

Read More »